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Abstract  
This article responds to a recent contribution to this journal. Procter and Radnor (2014) provide an 
account of teamworking in the UK Civil Service, specifically Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC), which focuses on the relationship between recently implemented lean work organisation 
and teams and teamworking. This intervention is prompted by criticism of the present authors’ 
published research into lean in the same locus (e.g. Carter et al, 2011a; 2011b; 2013a; 2013b). 
Procter and Radnor claim, without foundation we argue, that our work is ‘one-sided’ and that theirs 
delivers a ‘more nuanced’ analysis of lean in this government department - and it follows - of the 
lean phenomenon more generally. Our riposte critiques their article on several grounds. Firstly, it 
suffers from problems of logic and construction, conceptual confusion and definitional imprecision. 
Methodological difficulties and inconsistent evidence contribute additionally to analytical weakness. 
Included in our response are empirical findings on teamworking at HMRC, which challenge Procter 
and Radnor’s evidential basis and further reveal the shortcomings of their interpretation.   
Keywords 
Lean, lean working, teams, teamworking, targets, new public management, HMRC 
Introduction 
At the outset of this riposte to Procter and Radnor’s (2014) recent article on teams, teamworking 
and lean in the UK Civil Service, which criticises the present authors’ work (e.g. Carter et al, 2011a;b; 
2013a;b), it is important to provide some necessary contextualisation that locates our respective 
positions. The last decade has seen concerted efforts to transpose the principles of lean work 
organisation from manufacturing (Womack et al, 1990) to servicing and clerical work, particularly in 
the public sector. The justification for this diffusion has been the claim made by lean’s advocates of 
its ability to deliver significant efficiency savings and improvements in service quality in the contexts 
of the economies of ‘best value’ and, since 2010, of the ‘ConDem’ UK coalition government austerity 
programme. In Seddon’s words (2012), lean has seemed to be ‘an answer from heaven’, a silver 
bullet promising cost cutting, tightened task cycle times and reduced staffing levels without 
jeopardising - perhaps even enhancing - the customer experience.  
The salience of the political-economic context surrounding and driving what Procter and Radnor 
term ‘second-wave Lean in the UK’ (Procter and Radnor, 2014: 2981) is understated in their account 
of developments in Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the common locus of research that 
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forms the basis of contestation between us.  In their version, lean is assumed to be a superior 
organisational methodology and practice in both rational-technicist and normative senses, 
assumptions that we challenge. They ascribe insufficient explanatory power to the imperatives of 
tight budgets and new public management that drove its adoptioni, so that lean is presented as an 
autonomous set of practices and principles divorced not only from political-economic contexts and 
employment relations but also from the dynamics of a conflictual employment relationship.    
Womack and Jones’ (2003) contention that lean had universal applicability, and was not confinable 
to manufacturing, proved influential. Lean’s promise ‘not just to do more for less, but better for less’ 
(Radnor and Bucci, 2010) constituted its essential attractiveness, fuelling a growing acceptance by 
government and senior public sector management of lean’s applicability. Popularisers of lean 
distilled its purchase to five core ‘principles’ (relating to value and value streams, continuous flow 
and cycle times) which further helped to spawn management how-to toolkits (e.g. George et al, 
2004)ii. Increasingly, such practical guides focused on service work (Bicheno, 2008). Simplification of 
this kind was antithetical to the Toyota Production System (Seddon, 2005) and to the holistic nature 
of systems thinking, but it provided the means by which lean became widely implemented, at least 
in name, in clerical, service and even technical and professional work from the early-to-mid 2000s. 
Thus, the increased receptiveness of public sector management to hitherto neglected lean 
‘methodologies’ meshed with urgent governmental requirements for financial retrenchment. At this 
juncture academics realised the opportunity for consultancy projects as public sector bodies either 
considered or had recently implemented forms of lean working. Prominent among these was one of 
the co-authors of the article to which we are responding. Under the auspices of the AtoZ Business 
Consultancy, Radnor pursued a series of consultancies, including  the Scottish Government (2006), 
HMRC (Radnor and Bucci, 2007) and the Association of Business Schools (Radnor and Bucci, 2010) 
and, drawing on data from their reports, published widely in academic journals (e.g. Radnor and 
Boaden, 2008; Radnor and Walley, 2008; Radnor et al, 2012).  
While academic studies based on findings from consulting projects are not in principle problematic, 
such work is susceptible to bias towards managerial preoccupations or problems of data selectivity 
and interpretation, difficulties which, we argue, are manifest in Procter and Radnor’s article (2014). 
In the interests of balance and transparency, we explicate our own research methods and potential 
limitations, acknowledging the role of the Public Commercial and Services (PCS) trade union, which 
provided us with access and for whom we completed a research report (Carter et al, 2009). 
However, our critique of Procter and Radnor is based on more than epistemological and 
methodological difference.  We contend that Procter and Radnor’s (2014) argument is bedevilled by 
problems of logic and construction, conceptual confusion and definitional imprecision. Having 
neglected to consider in their literature review some of the more uncomfortable truths about lean 
and teamworking, analytical weakness is compounded by difficulties of method, data gathering and 
inconsistent evidence. In responding to Procter and Radnor’s criticism of our research, we draw on 
our own empirical findings on teamworking and lean at HMRC, which both challenge their evidential 
basis and reveal the shortcomings of their broader interpretation.  
Problems of Logic, Definition and Missing Literature 
Procter and Radnor (2014: 2979) pose four questions on teamworking and lean production that they 
claim their article ‘addresses’. The first appears, on the surface at least, to be a matter of clumsy 
expression, but a close reading of their paper suggests that it is much more than an unfortunate 
formulation. Indeed, because of the significant conceptual, methodological and empirical issues 
raised by the question it is worth quoting it in full: ‘Given the stated importance of teamworking in 
lean production, what would we expect teams to look like as part of the contemporary application of 
Lean thinking?’. In the following sections headed ‘Lean, lean teams and teamworking’ (ibid: 2979-
83), the authors’ use of the conditional becomes clear. They posit the need to understand what ‘that 
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[lean] team might look like’ (ibid: 2979) by reference to teams in the writings of the innovators of 
the term ‘lean’ (Womack et al.,1990: 99) and of the founder of the Toyota Production System (Ohno, 
1988)iii. It is valid methodologically, indeed desirable, to identify the original propositions on lean 
and teamworking and to subject them to empirical scrutiny in contemporary contexts. Evaluating the 
extent to which, and the reasons why, current managerial practice might depart from founding 
principles is important. What is problematic, though, is their construction of this (expected) version 
of teamworking under lean for the purpose of interrogating contemporary developments, while 
disregarding an established body of knowledge on lean and teamworking. Why posit such a 
conditional question, when hard evidence of lean’s ‘contemporary application’ lies at hand, 
supported by over 20 years of research? A more meaningful hypothesis would have been 
constructed around existing knowledge rather than the speculative counterfactualiv.  
Procter and Radnor (2014) neglect a body of largely well-known critical work on lean (e.g. Danford, 
1998; 1999; Delbridge, 1998; Landsbergis et al, 1999; Lewchuck and Robertson, 1997; Mehri, 2006; 
Sprigg and Jackson, 2006; Sprigg et al, 2007; Stewart et al, 2009)v. This omission may be less a breach 
of academic protocol and more a matter of avoiding uncomfortable evidence. Procter and Radnor 
imply that the ‘labour process’ perspective ‘underpinning this [Carter et al’s] conclusion’ (ibid: 2982) 
has dictated the nature of our evidence, specifically unadulterated Taylorism’. Such an inference 
that questions our methodological rigour and research ethics is untenable. Our studies do not 
constitute some kind of mechanical, ideologically driven, labour process outlier that stands ‘in 
contrast to’ all other studies (ibid: 2982). Rather our evidence of lean and its effects on employees is 
consistent with a well-established body of critical work. While certain expectations were inevitably 
informed by a reading of the critical literature, our approach was essentially inductive, to let the 
findings speak for themselves and, through a process of iteration, drawing conclusions that 
developed the conceptual frameworks most appropriate for explaining the phenomenon in 
question.  
The following synthesis of this work demonstrates engagement with this work and shows also how 
its absence renders Procter and Radnor’s account, and not ours, one-sided. In the conventional 
wisdom of lean, the team is accorded the status of ‘unique organisational form’ (Womack el al, 
1990). However, rather than becoming the locus of multi-skilling, job rotation, task enlargement and 
worker decision-making, the critical literature shows lean teams as exhibiting tighter supervisory 
surveillance and control, narrow tasking, detailed work and harsh targeting and highly circumscribed 
(if any) meaningful employee ‘voice’ and participation in decision-making. Instead of the ‘creative 
stress’, by which lean was meant to empower workers and to improve productivity, studies 
discovered heighted labour subordination, greater job strain and stress, physical and mental ill-
health and systemic managerial bullying.  
While many of these critical studies centred on manufacturing environments, some (e.g. Baldry et al, 
1998: Sprigg and Jackson, 2006; Sprigg et al, 2007) produced similar findings from clerical or service 
work. Sprigg and Jackson’s (2006) succinct verdict from their research into call centres was that ‘the 
leaner the call centre, the meaner it will be’. Without imputing motive, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the omission of this critical literature helps to explain the convoluted logic of the first 
hypothetical-conditional question. Missing two decades of critical research enables lean to be 
presented in a better light ‘in principle’ while ignoring uncomfortable truths revealed of lean in 
practice. The ‘prior expectations’, to which Procter and Radnor (2014: 2979) refer in their third 
question, should have been imbued with this critical evidence. 
Procter and Radnor’s treatment of teamworking is also deficient. Admittedly, they recognise that a 
central problem with teamworking might lie in reconciling the discretion exercised by workers in 
autonomous work groups (AWGs) with the tight continuous production flows associated with J-I-T 
(Just-in-Time) and lean. They cite Benders and van Hootegem’s (1999) identification of the ‘issue of 
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autonomy’ but, beyond this acknowledgement, their discussion frequently confuses rather than 
clarifies and their usage of teamworking lacks definitional purpose.  For instance, their treatment of 
teams in the health service (e.g. Finn et al, 2010) is largely descriptive, and while they echo its calls 
for greater clarity in definition (op cit, 2982) they do not provide it. Such imprecision is perhaps 
surprising given one of the co-author’s involvement in an influential edited collection on 
teamworking (Procter and Mueller, 2000).  
It is necessary to distinguish the traditions and variants of teamworking have been incorporated into 
managerial perspectives. Organic or naturally occurring groups or gangs (informal workgroups) were 
‘rediscovered’ by the Human Relations movement during the 1920s and were promoted by the 
Tavistock Institute as AWGs. In turn, AWGs were appropriated by the Socio-Technical school in the 
1950s, particularly in Scandinavia (e.g. Sandberg, 1993). In the 1980s, teamworking was rediscovered 
with new labels and was tied to the claim that organisations’ economic performance was dependant 
on ‘committed, flexible, multi-skilled, constantly retrained people, joined together in self-managing 
teams (Peters, 1987). In sum, the naturally occurring work group differs significantly from 
teamworking that is consciously utilised, or initiated, by management. The two main traditions of 
the latter are the socio-technical and the more recent Japanese forms. In the first, management 
attempts to harness the naturally-occurring collectivities, while in the second the team is 
constructed ‘from above’ and is associated with ‘lean production’, J-I-T and kaizen. Procter and 
Muller (2000) argue that these two traditions have come together, but the evidence from the 
literature suggests that the latter dominates and the socio-technical tradition is more claim than 
reality.  
The conflation of these traditions and forms of teamworking present Proctor and Radnor with an 
underlying theoretical problem. Referencing Vidal (2007), they use the terms ‘empowerment’ and 
‘autonomy’ (op cit: 2980; 2992) interchangeably, as if they were conceptually and substantively the 
same. Genuine autonomy is the outcome of inherent properties of group work, in which 
collectivities are able to exercise significant degrees of control over decision-making. In contrast, 
empowerment, a classic term in the unitarist HRM lexicon, gives to workers, operating within strict 
parameters at the very fringes of managerial power, a sense of decision-making at the level of 
immediate task performance (see Ramsay, 1996). The analytical precision that Marchington (2000) 
called for, and which is essential for cutting through the ambiguities and elasticity of the term 
‘teamworking’, is missing from their account. Employing rigorous criteria, including degree of self-
management, scope of activities, extent of polyvalent activity, member interdependence and so on 
(see Buchanan and McCalman, 1989 for an early example) would have proved beneficial. 
Instead, Procter and Radnor propose a ‘form of indirect autonomy’ as a ‘main defining characteristic 
of the lean team’ (op cit: 2980), one that is ‘effective through the responsibility that employees have 
for shaping SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures)’. This indirect autonomy does not come close to 
even a diluted form of the socio-technically inspired team, yet by a tortuous logic, these lean teams 
are held to constitute ‘a different kind of autonomy’. The basis for this claimed ‘indirect autonomy’ 
lies in worker responses to centrally imposed SOPs rather than to any worker involvement in their 
formulation (ibid: 2988-90). Numerous studies have demonstrated the strict constraints imposed by 
SOPs on team members (Parker and Slaughter, 1988; Delbridge et al, 2000) and evidence from 
manufacturing shows the deleterious consequences for workers (Danford, 1999; Lewchuk and 
Roberston, 1997: Mehri; 2006; Stewart et al, 2009). It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the 
life raft of ‘indirect autonomy’ that Procter and Radnor use to rescue ‘autonomy’ is full of holes. The 
evidence section (op cit: 2988-2990), discussed below, contains little other than team and individual 
team member compliance to tightly prescribed protocols, consistent with the evidence of Carter et 
al (2009). No support for the notion of the ‘indirect autonomy’ in the secondary literature is adduced 
other than that by Procter and Currie (2004).  
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As if conceding that this muddled notion of ‘indirect autonomy’ fails to denote autonomy in any 
meaningful sense, Procter and Radnor return to studies of teamwork in HRMC’s predecessor, the 
Inland Revenue (IR). Their second rescue attempt seeks to construct some notion of autonomy 
around ‘target-based teamworking [which] can be seen as being reliant on outcome 
interdependence’ (Procter and Currie, 2004: 1567). Notwithstanding individual case workingvi and 
appraisals which run counter to teamworking principles, the authors claim employees identify with 
teamworking ‘based on their team’s goal or target output’ (ibid; 1567). Now, the importance of 
team targets in the UK civil service have long been recognised (e.g. Baldry et al, 1998), but such 
research is neglected by Procter and Radnor. It depicts team targets as being the aggregate of 
workers’ individual targets based on task individualism and work intensification, which do not 
engender even normative or cultural attributes of teamworking. The routine white collar work 
represented by Baldry et al (1998) developed under the pressure of efficiency imperatives and the 
‘Team Taylorism’ of fragmented, detailed tasks subjected to tight control and surveillance strikingly 
resembles the realities of teamworking at HMRC.  
We do agree with Procter and Radnor that teams at HMRC are not ‘pseudo teams’, in that they are 
not merely cosmetic, although Procter and Radnor (2014) do make a surprising confession given the 
overall tenor of their argument when they state that ‘for some [in HMRC] the operations of the 
teams were not seen as an important issue…a team was little more than nominal’ (2014: 2990). 
However, rather than trying to construct a case round ‘indirect autonomy’ or engaging in the fallacy 
that team-based targets generate a tangible sense of collective teamworking, it may have been 
more fruitful had they acknowledged or, better still, worked with the concept of ‘teams without 
teamworking’. The work of van den Broek et al (2004) on teamworking in call centres is instructive. 
Utilising a model that comprises three dimensions of teamworking – technical, governance and 
normative – van den Broek et al found that team structures were constructed in terms of ‘spans of 
control’. With self-governance almost entirely absent ‘teamworking did not exist in any substantive 
or traditional sense’ (2004: 211). Teams do have a managerial purpose as mechanisms of 
administrative control, dividing up large workforces, enabling effective supervision and monitoring 
and facilitating cultural and normative goals. In this account, team leaders or front line managers are 
perhaps more important than the teams themselves. Importantly, teams exist also as organisational 
entities designed to engender the internalisation of corporate values, an objective that has palpably 
failed at HMRC.  
Methodology and Methods 
Underlying methodological problems stem from the original consulting project. Radnor and Bucci 
(2007) were commissioned through their AtoZ Consultancy by HMRC to provide an evaluation of the 
Pacesetter programme as the centrepiece of the government agency’s lean project. Throughout this 
and other reports (e.g. Radnor et al, 2006; Radnor and Bucci, 2010), the authors insist that they 
provide an ‘independent assessment’ of management’s lean initiatives. Yet the degree of 
independence is open to question.   
The ‘Interview outline/schedule for Focus Groups’ used in the HMRC study (Radnor and Bucci, 2007: 
85) contains a preamble laden with normative assumptions, making reference to ‘efficiency 
improvement methodologies’, and prescriptive intent, that their work can enable HMRC ‘to continue 
to make informed decisions and responses about the development and use of Lean and Operational 
Management/Senior Leadership’. More blatantly, they state that they are ‘especially interested in 
understanding how the [lean] methodology used has improved (our emphasis) your working 
environment and processes as well as the sustainability of these interventions’. Framed in this 
manner, only positive contributions are solicited at the expense of balanced questions that might 
prompt the reporting of negative experiencesvii. Of greater concern, though, regarding the 
potentially compromised independence of the study is the admission that their final evaluation 
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report ‘was validated by senior HMRC personnel’ (Procter and Radnor, 2014: 2987). Perhaps in 
anticipation of such criticism, they draw the distinction between the report and the paper but, since 
the data set is identical, this defence is a sophistry. 
Concerns arise also over method and technique. First, there is the issue of the number of 
participants and the nature of their participation. The authors state that 296 personnel were 
involved in ‘semi-structured interviews or focus groups’, an impressive number, but examination of 
the data sources and sites (ibid: 2985-6) indicates that interviews were conducted only with senior 
management (SOs or HOs) or ‘lean experts’ - with the exception of one trade union representative. 
As many as 230 research subjects were either at AA (Administrative Assistants), AO Administrative 
Officer or O (Officer) grades. When they declare that these grades were ‘interviewed in focus 
groups’ (ibid: 2987), they are guilty of conflating quite different qualitative research methods. 
Second, no information is provided of the conditions in which the focus groups took place or how 
the participants were selected or volunteered. Third, at two sites front-line managers (Os) were 
‘mixed’ with non-supervisory grades (AOs and AAs), with unacknowledged consequences for the 
latter’s freedom of expression and confidentiality. Fourth, no information is provided of their 
approach to the analysis of the focus group data, a challenging undertaking given the different 
grades of employee involved, the number of focus groups (27) and the large number of participants 
(average 9 per group) for such a relatively short duration (45-60 minutes). Finally, difficulties emerge 
in the presentation of the evidence. On numerous occasions it is unclear to whom and to what grade 
the quotes are attributable; for example, ‘one officer said’ (ibid: 2990), ‘one interviewee expressed’ 
(2991) and ‘a third employee’ said (ibid: 2991). The grade of the interviewee is not an immaterial 
consideration when interpreting the salience of their testimony.  
In the interests of equity and in order to frame our rebuttal, we explicate our research approach and 
summarise our methods. Although supported and given access by the Public and Commercial 
Services (PCS) union, this study was not initiated nor commissioned by them. A report was prepared 
for PCS, but we remained throughout the research and dissemination process unequivocally 
independent, to the point where published work has been quite critical of PCS’s leadership (Carter et 
al, 2012). Within mainstream studies management perspectives are over-represented (Alvesson and 
Skoldberg, 2000) so, given the central objective of our research to examine perceptions and 
experiences of lean, employee survey responses and interview narratives were entirely appropriate. 
Consequently, our purpose was not to chase elusive and unattainable universal truths of lean but, 
committed to giving expression to the experiences and voices of the marginalised agents within the 
dominant discourse; we sought to ‘offset the unequal resources available to them compared to 
managers’ (Brook and Darlington, 2013: 2136). This orientation does not render our research 
approach problematic nor mean that our evidential basis is narrow.  
The combination of qualitative (unstructured and semi-structured interviews) and quantitative 
methods (11-page questionnaire) delivered a data set of depth and breadth (840 completed surveys 
and 36 in-depth interviews) that permitted the thorough investigation of lean through the prism of 
front line agents. Other data sources (documentation, management interviews, HMRC sources) 
provide some triangulation. The detail of the method is best found in Carter et al, (2013b:752-5) and 
shows reflexivity on the strengths and limitations of worker-centred knowledge, retrospective recall, 
sample representativeness and the danger of biasviii. Procter and Radnor’s principal line of criticism is 
that our interpretation is ‘almost exclusively negative’ and one-sided in contrast to their ‘more 
nuanced alternative’ (2014: 2992). As we demonstrate shortly, the conflict is not between our 
purported negativity and their claimed nuance, but difference based on the respective weight, status 
and transparency of evidence. Lest our alleged negativity might be seen as the outcome of a biased 
survey instrument, we emphasise how our questions were carefully constructed, including those 
using the Likert scale, to allow for a full range of possible answers.  
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The Weight of Evidence 
This section bridges methodological/epistemological considerations, on the one hand, and empirical 
concerns and the presentation of evidence on the other hand. A major issue for Procter and Radnor, 
to repeat, is our alleged negativity. It is true that our evidence of negative responses to lean does 
frequently involve significant, even overwhelming majorities. To provide some examples; 77 per cent 
reported that HMRC ‘does not listen to your suggestions on lean’; following lean only 5 per cent 
reported that they ‘set [their] own pace of work’ either ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a great deal’, compared to 78 
per cent before lean; only 16 per cent before lean felt ‘quite’ or ‘very pressurised’ as a result of work 
on a normal day compared to 95 per cent after lean; the factors that contributed either ‘a great deal’ 
or ‘to some extent’ to the pressure were meeting individual targets (92 per cent), meeting team 
targets (90 per cent), keeping to SOPs (81 per cent), continuous workflow (70 per cent); almost four 
in five (89 per cent) reported that work intensity had increased either ‘a lot’ or a ‘little’ after lean; 62 
per cent believed that ‘the skill content of work’ had decreased ‘a little’ or ‘a lot’ after lean (Carter et 
al, 2009). These emphatic findings are not a contrived negativity but are comprehensive evidence of 
workers’ genuine antipathy towards lean during the process of its implementation and through 
experiences of lean working in the reconfigured organisation.   
In contrast, the reported evidence by Procter and Radnor is ambiguous, contradictory and often 
misleading. To give some examples: they state that ‘a number of front-line staff….pointed to the 
negative consequences of’ undertaking detailed, post-lean, detailed task, data inputting  (2914: 
2988); they claim that ‘some welcomed lean on the basis that it gave then a greater structure’ (2014: 
2992)’; and that ‘Focus groups referred to improved “team spirit”’ (ibid: 2992). No indication is given 
of the relative weight of responses when mixed experiences or perceptions are reported. If a 
number of front-line staff were critical of the practice of fragmented data inputting and others were 
not, the real questions are how many were in each camp and how representative are the statements 
reported? If some welcomed the structural certainty lean provided, again, the question is how 
many? If, as indicated, focus groups reported improved team spirit, the questions prompted are how 
many focus groups, involving what grades and how many within these groups believed this 
improvement was the case?  It is not enough to assert that ‘the balance was very much on the 
positive side’ regarding staff involvement in problem-solving (ibid: 2989) without demonstrating 
how the evidence stacks up.   
This argument against their methods stands even where they attempt to be more specific.  Their 
most substantive claim is that there were notable variations in the implementation and practice of 
Lean between local processing offices and district processing offices, on the one hand, and National 
Offices, on the other: 
The national processing centres . . . were able to use their respective unique positions 
as a means of retaining some control over how they did their work, which in turn 
encouraged a greater degree of involvement on the part of front-line staff (2990). 
 
This assessment appears to be based on the relative power of senior managers in the national 
centres, enabled through their control of unique areas of work, making it easier for them to shape 
and develop the SOPs, rather than having to conform to an externally imposed nationwide blueprint’ 
(2990).  In effect Procter and Radnor’s evidence conflates the views of managers and those of 
workers.  Our data from one of the same national offices studied demonstrate neither significant 
difference from local offices in levels of employee involvement, nor in measures of ‘indirect 
autonomy’.  What difference there was between offices was negligible in comparison with the 
pronounced decline in measures of job quality. At the national office,  ‘frequent’ or sometimes’ help 
from team members reduced by 26% after the introduction of lean.  Moreover, while help declined 
the pressure exerted on each other rose from 13% to 52 after lean suggesting the transformation 
between members to harsher relations.  Job rotation similarly declined by 33%.  The reduction in the 
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use of expertise was even starker at 49%. Qualitative data similarly revealed no great difference in 
experiences.  One employee at the national office described the parameters of involvement: ‘Any 
criticism, it had to be … this came from the LEAN council’s mouth … criticism had to be positive.  
Negative criticism had to be … had to have a positive spin on it’ (PCS branch committee member).  
 
Teamworking at HMRC - A Tale of Two Case Studies or Two Tales of One Case Study 
Radnor and Bucci’s asserted that ‘teamworking [at HMRC] was generally acknowledged to be better 
under lean and there was a better team spirit’ (2007: 7). That the evidential basis for this claim was 
questionable can be seen from a close reading of the report but also from our survey’s findings.  The 
responses to a four-item question (Carter et al, 2009) (Table 1) provide compelling evidence that 
following the introduction of lean employees believed that teams had less relevance regarding the 
locus of interdependence, task enlargement, multi-skilled and problem solving.  
First, there is a decline in the extent of reported collaboration and interdependence, as indicated by 
the 60 per cent of respondents who said they frequently received help from team members before 
lean, compared to the 26 per cent after lean’s introduction. Second, there is the constrained extent 
of job rotation. According to 70 per cent of respondents, task rotation which is one of the 
shibboleths of lean ‘frequently’ or ‘sometimes’ occurred before the introduction of lean, compared 
to 30 per cent who believed this was the case after lean. Third, and perhaps the most striking 
contrast is that between the 65 per cent of respondents who believed that, before lean, they 
‘frequently’ used their expertise and capability and only 11 per cent thought that this was true in 
post-lean conditions. A mere 4 per cent considered that they ‘hardly ever’ or ‘never’ used their 
expertise and capability before lean, compared to 54 per cent who stated that this was the case 
after lean. Fourth, the evidence indicates the growth of peer group pressure; only 14 percent of 
respondents felt that they had been put under pressure by other team members to work harder 
before lean, a proportion that had grown to 54 per cent after lean.   
Table 1: Perceptions of Teamworking Before and After Lean (n=840) 
How frequently did/do you experience the following 
aspects of teamworking BEFORE and AFTER the 
introduction of lean?  
Frequently 
% 
Before    After 
Sometimes 
% 
Before   After 
Hardly Ever 
% 
Before       After 
Never 
% 
Before   After 
Help received from team members 60 26 34 46 5 25 1 8 
Task rotation in your team 33 11 38 19 17 35 10 34 
Use of my expertise and capability 65 11 31 34 3 36 1 18 
Pressure to work harder from other team members 2 18 12 36 38 21 47 21 
 
Now, it is not to present team working before lean as some white-collar idyllic craft, but it is to 
emphasise how the introduction of lean into HMRC resulted in a thoroughgoing restructuring of 
work organisation that transformed the job.  Prior to lean the tax officer undertook whole case 
working (Fisher, 2004) that saw the completion of a series of relatively standardised tasks certainly, 
but involved job rotation, task discretion and a degree of ‘responsible autonomy’ (Friedman, 1977). 
Lean saw segmentation, standardisation and simplification of work processes through utilising 
classic Taylorist time and motion and the spatial reordering of work stations to minimise 
unnecessary worker motions and activity (Carter et al, 2011b). Its intention was to create a distinct 
breach or rupture with past traditions of work in an informal sense and in the more formal sense of 
‘the way that things are done’. 
Carter et al’s position is consistent. Not only does the weight of statistical evidence, based on a 
carefully formulated and rigorously analysed questionnaire, emphatically expose the work 
fragmentation, deskilling, excessive monitoring and work intensification that lean brought, so too 
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does abundant employee testimony deliver compelling first-hand insight. Space constraints prohibit 
more than the one rather lengthy quote:  
The use of hourly monitoring and whiteboards serve no purpose to management other than 
to apply pressure on staff to work harder. The unrealistic targets that management set are 
not based on valid timing exercises. They have produced higher targets without explanation. 
If any lean procedures are challenged or questioned by staff, then staff are accused of being 
negative. Daily meetings are basically a waste of time and do not add any value to staff or 
customers.  (Lothians, Administrative Officer) 
Reading Procter and Radnor’s article dispassionately, the striking conclusion is how little support 
they actually muster for their claimed balanced view of lean and how little evidence is marshalled to 
undermine Carter et al’s. On the contrary, many of their quotes are quite consistent with our study. 
Notwithstanding their problem of scale and identification (how many and who) they observe (2014: 
2987) that ‘there was evidence of employees feeling that work had become fragmented and 
degraded with employees responsible now for ‘only a particular part of a [tax] return’. Another 
employee complained, ‘Like everyone else I feel I’ve been deskilled’ (ibid: 2988).  Relentless work 
pressure resulted from the cascading downwards of SOPs that remained impervious to workforce 
influence. With regard to suggested changes to unacceptable targets, ‘Even some of those at Officer 
and Higher Officer Level…expressed frustration at the fact that their proposals were not always put 
into effect’. On the matter of the centrally driven SOPs, Procter and Radnor (ibid: 2989) state that 
there was ‘no real input’ into how processes were implemented, yet this a key notion summonsed 
by them in favour of ‘indirect autonomy’.   
Nevertheless, Procter and Radnor attempt to ameliorate the negative representation of lean, but the 
continuous criticism of it throughout their article makes their defence Maginot-like in its 
effectiveness. Ultimately, they fall back on the justification that the reorganization of work 
associated with lean brought greater certainty; ‘staff now had a better idea of who their immediate 
colleagues were and, as a result, would discuss work with them much more than before…[a feeling] 
encouraged by the holding of daily team meetings and by the physical presence of team 
performance boards’ (2104: 2990).  
This claim that inter-colleague communication was enhanced by lean is challenged by the evidence 
on time spent, post-lean, at the work station (Carter, 2013b: 759) whilst engaged in tasks. 
Remarkably, 48 per cent of respondents spent 95 per cent or more of their work time constantly 
engaged in tasks and a further 38 per cent spent between 85 per cent and 95 per cent. In these 
conditions of extremely reduced porosity of the working day, over and again respondents provided 
testimony of how they were no longer able to speak to work colleagues in formal (often problem-
solving ways) as they had been previously. Indeed, 35 per cent of those surveyed believed that now 
‘no time to talk to colleagues’ contributed ‘a great deal’ to the daily pressure of the job (ibid: 761). 
The replacement of this ongoing lateral engagement between colleague - that might be regarded as 
typical AWG behaviour - by formal, scheduled, team leader-led, team meetings that were dominated 
by targets and their achievement and underperformance, had the ironical effect of belittling genuine 
teamworking. Such developments call to mind a vivid early illustration of the displacement of AWGs 
by lean – or ‘Japanised’ – teams. Taylor and Ramsay (1998) reported how at the ASDA supermarket 
women on the deli counter had been ‘autonomously responsible’ for all manner of work activities, 
from organising shifts to interchanging roles. Then the company introduced team briefs, daily target 
discussions, and structured procedures which curtailed interaction, leading one experienced worker 
to comment, ‘When they brought in teamworking they stopped us team working’. Thus, it was the 
case at HMRC.  
The additional claim that Procter and Radnor make, that the ‘physical presence of team performance 
boards’ deepened the feeling and awareness of teamworking and enhanced communication, is 
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unsustainable. If a single aspect of the new regime of lean teamworking could be isolated as the 
symbol of all that was disliked, it would be the whiteboards and the hourly targets. As many as 54 
per cent of survey respondents (Carter et al, 2013b: 761) reported that the whiteboards contributed 
to a great extent towards pressure of work on a daily basis. More testimony was volunteered on this 
specific issue than any other and, it should noted, the removal of whiteboards became a central and 
popular union demand. Procter and Radnor even undermine the positive portrayal of teamworking 
when they quote a front line worker saying that ‘daily meetings are a waste of time and resource’ 
(2014: 2991). 
In sum, Procter and Radnor’s evidence is strikingly contradictory. They hark back to Procter and 
Currie’s (2004: 1567) narrow claim for teamworking that ‘it is employees’ identification with their 
team’s goal or target output, rather than their identification with their fellow team members, that 
provides their identification with the team’ (1567).  Dubious in terms of conception and in relation to 
a body of critical literature, this assertion has even less substance when they set their ambiguous 
findings against the robust evidence of Carter et al’s.   
Government Sources  
Part of Procter and Radnor’s (2014: 2983) case against us is to question the claims that our work is 
supported by evidence from official government sources. In fact, Procter and Radnor misrepresent 
our use of this evidence by incorrectly stating that the Civil Service People Survey (CSPS) is cited in 
Carter et al. (2013a). They confuse it with the Treasury Select Committee (2010), a cross-government 
staff survey that ranked HMRC as having the ‘most unhappy’ workforce in the 53 departments 
surveyed. The Committee criticised HMRC for low morale and its culture of ‘command and control’, 
in which many overstretched staff were facing burnout as management drove them ‘to go the extra 
mile’. 
Yet, the CSPS, which Procter and Radnor claim does not lend support to our work, reported that the 
HMRC had the 'least engaged' of any Civil Service workforce (2014: 2983) with its ‘employee 
engagement index’ the lowest of any department (at 34% compared to a high of 72% and median of 
56%). They assert that ‘the situation is not so uniformly bleak as Carter et al suggest’ (2014: 2983), 
because we neglect scores for ‘resources and workload’, a category which includes items on ‘skills 
and workload’ and ‘My team’. Now, we acknowledge that the survey indicates that some areas of 
work, although still below the Civil Service benchmark did show higher positive responses and, 
moreover, the high scores for questions for My Team might appear to indicate some support for 
teamworking. However, deconstructing the specific questions comprising the My Team composite 
reveals potential errors in Procter and Radnor’s conclusions. Where scores are high as, for example, 
in the response to ‘the people in my team can be relied upon to help when things get difficult in my 
job’ (82 per cent) and ‘the people in my team work together to find ways to improve the service we 
provide’ (76 per cent), they reflect informal group and collegiate solidarity rather than technical 
questions of lean and teamworking. Further, responses resonate with employee commitment to the 
public sector ethos which is associated with opposition to lean working. 
The likelihood of group identification, as opposed to lean teamwork being the major influence on My 
Team scores is supported by results from two additional themes: work and line management. CSPS 
revealed that, while 72 per cent of respondents ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that they were 
interested in their work, the average of positive responses to My Work was 49 per cent, 22 
percentage points below the civil service benchmark. This figure was driven down by very low scores 
in HMRC on ‘the amount of control’ staff felt they had over their work. HMRC scored well below the 
civil service threshold. Further, only 28 per cent believed they were involved in decisions affecting 
their work, an ‘in-house’ finding that in and of itself is quite damning of lean.  
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Despite censure of the ‘command and control’ culture within the leaned HMRC (Treasury Select 
Committee, 2011), front line management are not the object of unmitigated hostility. Employees see 
them as willing to listen to employee ideas (70 per cent) and only 21 per cent were dissatisfied with 
the amount of respect they received from line managers. The latter percentage compares with the 
60 per cent dissatisfied with senior managers (Carter et al, 2014).  How do we make sense of this 
interesting distinction? The explanation may well lie in the depth and breadth of antagonism to work 
organisation in the lean environment, for which senior management are seen as responsible. In 
contrast, many front-line managers who, it must be remembered, are largely drawn from and have 
empathy with the ranks of the employees, were themselves deeply unhappy with the rationality of 
the lean changes and the roles that they had been forced to adopt (Carter et al, 2014). 
In sum, Procter and Radnor are unsuccessful in their attempt to eke out some positive message from 
these government reports and, simultaneously, fail to undermine our critical case against 
teamworking in HMRC’s lean. 
Conclusion 
HMRC constitutes perhaps the most important case study of lean working in the UK public sector, 
because it may be ‘the closest of any public service organisation to date in implementing the 
complete lean philosophy’ (Radnor and Boaden, 2008: 2). What is remarkable about Procter and 
Radnor’s (2014) article is how unsuccessful it is in making a case for lean teamworking consistent 
with the original propositions of Womack et al (1990: 5). It should be remembered the latter had 
insisted that, ‘In the end, it is the dynamic team that emerges at the heart of the lean factory’ and 
that ‘workers need to be taught a wide variety of skills so that tasks can be rotated’ and  ‘must have 
the ability to think proactively to devise solutions before problems become serious’.  
These virtuous characteristics of teamwork are notable by their absence in HMRC’s back office 
where downward cascades of tightly prescribed targets dictate claustrophobic monitoring and the 
hourly measurement of outputs and performance. Management measures performance, as 
elsewhere (Taylor, 2013), and disciplines those who fail to meet them. Procter and Radnor’s claims 
of ‘target-based teamwork’ and ‘indirect autonomy’ are not just conceptually flawed but empirically 
unsustainable, given that no real evidence is proffered of employees’ ability to shape SOPs or to 
amend targets at HMRC. This conclusion should not come as a revelation to those familiar with the 
critical literature on lean and teamworking, from Lewchuk and Robertson (1997) to Stewart et al 
(2009), but which appears to have escaped the attentions of Procter and Radnor. It is impossible to 
conceive how ‘responsible autonomy’ (Friedman, 1997) or the chimera of ‘indirect autonomy’ could 
be realised in such a ‘labour constrained’ market environment at HMRC in which, as Procter and 
Radnor concede ‘workers should produce as much as they can’ (2014: 2993).  
We agree with Procter and Radnor when they describe our research as a ‘largely negative portrayal 
of Lean’(2014: 2979), as ‘unequivocally’ negative (op cit: 2982) and as an ‘almost exclusively negative 
interpretation’ (op cit, 2992). The reasons for this negativity do not lie in bias or weakness of method 
or interpretation, but are much more straightforward. The findings reflect the widespread and deep-
seated opposition of employees to teamworking under lean at HMRC. Certainly, we would have 
preferred not to have uncovered such an increasing immiseration of working lives, including the 
terrible associated problems of occupational ill-health (Carter, et al, 2013b), but the data compelled 
such a transparent and consistent interpretation. The specific weight of evidence in Carter et al’s 
work does not signify one-sidedness or bias, nor does the mixture of positive and negative responses 
in Procter and Radnor’s article indicate nuance.  
One of the curious aspects of Procter and Radnor’s (2014) article is that its cautiously favourable 
evaluation of lean, in general, is not matched by much in the way of supporting evidence. Many of 
the illustrative quotes are quite critical. Winding the film backwards, Radnor and Bucci’s (2007) 
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initial report on HMRC, based on the same dataset is, by way of contrast, much more positive about 
the outcome of Pacesetter, insisting that HMRC was ‘moving in the right direction’ to become a lean 
organisation. Teamworking was claimed to be better under lean and team spirit much improved. 
Reference is made here and elsewhere to the ‘lean journey’, a teleological positivity that 
acknowledged difficulties only on the grounds of ‘incorrect implementation’ or ‘work in progress’. 
Seddon (2012) criticised Radnor and Bucci (2007) for failing to admit to ‘deleterious effects’ for 
employees.  
So a shift has taken place from the overt managerialism of the 2007 consulting report to the guarded 
criticism of the academic article of 2014. It appears as if Procter and Radnor now want to run with 
the hares and hunt with the hounds, to hedge their bets on whether lean can still become that 
‘sustainable’ ‘methodology’ to use two of their over-used words, or whether its damaging impact on 
both the experience and outcomes of labour and the accumulated weight of criticism will damage its 
usefulness for management. Managerial fads and fashions tend to have limited currency so that, in 
order to remain credible one-time promulgators and evangelists may evolve into critics. More 
recently, Radnor and Osborne (2013: 265) have argued that ‘the implementation of lean to date has 
been defective’. Bizarrely, some of Radnor’s earlier co-authored work has been quoted critically in 
Procter and Radnor’s article (2014: 2981); thus, ‘positive outcomes have been reported (e.g. Radnor 
and Boaden, 2008) but they do need to be looked at with great caution’. Now this is not so much a 
rigorous auto-critique, as a chameleon-like shifting of position to blend in with a more critical 
zeitgeist.      
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i
 A striking example of this political-economic deficit is the failure to refer to the new Labour government’s  
implementation of 10,500 job cuts at HMRC from 2004, to the appointment of Sir David Varney who embarked 
on a wholesale change programmes in ‘mimicry’ of private sector values and disciplines. Nor is the decisive 
Gershon (2004) report mentioned.  
ii
 Radnor’s consultant reports repeat Womack and Jones’ distilled five core principles in a kind of ‘plug and 
play’ section on lean’s background (e.g. Radnor et al, 2006; 8-9; Radnor and Bucci, 2007: 67; Radnor and Bucci, 
2010:13). 
iii
 Procter and Radnor do not elaborate on the ways in which teams and teamworking are used by the Toyota 
Production System 
iv
 A more satisfactory question might be formulated along these lines, ‘To what extent and in what ways do the 
teamworking practices and employee experiences of lean identified at HMRC, differ from or are consistent 
with knowledge of teams and teamworking in lean environments based on two decades of research? ‘. 
v
 Taking care not to misrepresent Procter and Radnor (2014), we do acknowledge that they refer to some 
limited work on lean (Conti and Warner, 1993; Benders and van Hootegem, 2000; Delbridge et al, 2000; Vidal, 
2007), but their review is truncated and largely unsatisfactory and incomplete. 
vi
 We argue that individual case working is actually more compatible with ‘autonomous’ teamworking than the 
fragmented, detailed work of the lean teams.     
vii
 Radnor and Bucci’s encouragement of positive views should be seen within the context of contemporary 
industrial relations. When Radnor and Bucci’s conducted their research (January to June 2007) employee and 
union (PCS) opposition to lean was so intense that it had already manifested itself in strike action in the 
Lothians (April 2006), backed by an overwhelming majority (80 per cent) of members, and was to produce 
national strike action.  
viii
 Such reflexive concerns are absent from Procter and Radnor. 
